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Introduction
The political debate about the future of the public pension system in Germany has shifted from the issue of its financial sustainability to the question whether it will avoid old-age poverty, especially among the younger birth cohorts (see, e.g., OECD 2007) . There are various factors affecting the development of income maintenance in old age. Although the pension reforms since 1992 have improved the long-term financial sustainability of the public pension system, they have substantially reduced income replacement rates. Furthermore, since reunification there has been rising and persistent unemployment particularly in East Germany. At the same time, there has been a trend away from the "standard" employment relationships covered by social security towards "flexible" work patterns typically not or only partially covered by social security, such as "marginal employment", temporary employment, part-time jobs, and self-employment. A recent report commissioned by the Public Pension Insurance Fund and the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (AVID 2005) suggests that these factors will lead to substantial reductions in the level of public pensions among younger birth cohorts, especially in East Germany.
The goal of the present study is to quantify the likely impact of these developments on the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts. To this end, we develop a microsimulation model which accounts for cohort effects in individual employment and unemployment and earnings over the lifecycle as well as the differential impact of recent pension reforms on birth cohorts. To account for cohort effects on the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts is important for at least two reasons.
On the one hand, the impact of the recently enacted pension reforms will affect younger birth cohorts to a much greater degree than cohorts already close to retirement. In particular, this concerns the demographic adjustment mechanism which determines the level of public pensions relative to current wages and the increase of the legal retirement age to 67 years by 2029. Furthermore, actuarial adjustments for early retirement and phasing out of special early retirement options for the unemployed and women were enacted which, given the relatively long phase-in period, also had heterogeneous effects on older and younger birth cohorts.
On the other hand, changes in the labor market that occurred during the past decades affected cohorts quite differently. One of the most obvious examples for the potential importance of cohort effects is the worsening of the labor market situation in East Germany in the aftermath of reunification. Birth cohorts in East Germany differ with respect to the share of their working life spent in the former GDR where open unemployment was virtually nonexistent and wages relatively equally distributed. Both factors as well as the politically mandated equalization of GDR pension entitlements to West German levels resulted in relatively high and uniform pension entitlements of East Germans already near the early retirement age when they were integrated into the West German public pension scheme.
East Germans in the middle of their career were affected quite differently by unification: In the first years of the transition, large parts of the economy had to be rebuild under the new market based system and caused redundancies and closure of factories on a large scale.
Endowed with human capital from the former GDR they had to find new jobs in the unified labor market. This process, however, turned out to be a slow and the unemployment rate in East Germany, on average, is still double the West German level. Furthermore, wage convergence almost came to a standstill in the mid-1990s, with a substantial wage differential remaining (see Franz and Steiner 2000) . In West Germany, the younger birth cohorts may also have been affected by the worsening of general labor market conditions. However, another cohort effect which might have contributed to differences across birth cohorts is the increasing labor force participation among women, especially those with higher education. In the German public pension system, cohort effects in employment histories have both a direct and indirect effect on the individual pension benefit. The direct effect relates to total employment over the life-cycle, the indirect effect works through lower wages due to previous unemployment.
The relevance of these cohort effects, if any, is of course an empirical question and depends on the chosen identification strategy which will be described in Section 3. Using a large and representative panel data set -the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) -we are able to place emphasis on important socio-economic characteristics in addition to the birth cohort. We distinguish between East and West Germany and men and women throughout our analysis. Furthermore, we analyse the impact of education. Education has a well documented effect on both the employment probability and the wage level. In addition to the perspective of the individual pension, we simulate pension outcomes also on a household level. There we also describe how estimated cohort effects are used to project individual employment biographies and earnings which determine the individual pension level.
Our estimation results, summarized in Section 4, show that cohort effects vary greatly between region, gender, and education. The estimated cohort effects in individual employment patterns affect lifecycle wage profiles used to simulate future earnings for cohorts born between 1937 and 1971. Using simulated life cycle employment and income, we project gross future pensions across cohorts taking into account changing demographics and recent pension reforms. We look mainly at public pensions at the individual level from various perspectives. Simulation results show that pension levels for East German men and women will fall dramatically among younger birth cohorts, not only because of policy reforms but due to higher cumulated unemployment. For West German men, the small reduction of average pension levels among younger birth cohorts is mainly driven by the impact of pension reforms, while future pension levels of West German women are increasing or stable due to a rising labor market participation of younger birth cohorts. As summarized in the conclusion, these results shed light on the adequacy of future public pensions among younger age cohorts which is of crucial importance for social policy.
Empirical and Institutional Background

Evidence on changing work patterns across birth cohorts
Since reunification Germany has seen high and persistent unemployment with an extraordinary increase in long-term unemployment in East Germany. At the same time, fulltime employment has been partially substituted for by part-time jobs and "marginal employment" not covered by social security (see, e.g., Rische 1999 , Faik et al. 2001 , Sachverständigenrat 2008 . These labor market developments are likely to reinforce the negative impact of recent pension reforms (see Section 2.2) on the level of public pensions especially of younger birth cohorts.
There are a few studies analyzing the impacts of unemployment and changing employment patterns on future pension benefits across cohorts for Germany. Most of these studies were based on the AVID reports ("Altersvorsorge in Deutschland") for the years 1996 and 2005 which investigate public and private pension provision of people aged between 40 and 60 (DRV 2000 (DRV , 2007 . 1 The studies based on AVID 1996 report a weak negative trend for pension entitlements of younger cohorts of men born 1951-55 relative to those born 1936-40, particularly in East Germany. While younger cohorts of women tend to work more than older cohorts in West Germany, a substantial decline in employment and increase in unemployment is observed among younger cohorts of women in East Germany. The AVID 2005 study shows that these trends have continued in recent years: West German women continue to increase their labor market participation, in particular part-employment, while employment of West German men remains fairly stable across cohorts. For East Germany, the trend is negative for both men and women, with a substantial increase in unemployment.
Using administrative data of recent entry cohorts of pensioners, Himmelreicher and Frommert (2006) report similar but weaker trends. The data are not available for scientific research outside the Public Pension Fund and the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the two institutions which have jointly commissioned these surveys. For a summary of studies based on AVID 1996 see Steiner (2003) .
2 For a description of the SOEP, see Section 3.1. How will the weakening of full-time employment and increasing unemployment among younger birth cohorts affect future levels of public pensions? As described in the next section, the German public pension system implies a fairly close relationship between an individual's lifetime earnings and the level of her own public pension. This relationship implies that unemployment may affect individual pension entitlements in two ways: First, by reducing the employment years counted towards individual pension entitlements and, secondly, by negatively affecting the life-cycle wage profile. Regarding this latter effect, empirical studies by Licht and Steiner (1992) , Beblo and Wolf (2002) , and Wunder (2006) indicate that unemployment or non-employment spells have significant long-term effects on an individual's future earnings, and that these effects tend to be the stronger, the longer these spells have lasted. The illustrative calculations presented in Wunder (2006) also show how the increasing importance of unemployment among younger age cohorts may affect their future pension levels.
The German PAYG pension system -structure and reforms
The public pension scheme in Germany is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. 3 As such, population ageing is expected to put pressure on its financial sustainability in the coming decades, mainly due to three factors: rising life expectancy, very low fertility rates (between 3 For a more detailed account of the German public pension system and recent reforms, see, e.g., Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999).
1.3 and 1.4), and a baby boomer generation reaching the retirement age in the coming years. As reinforcing negative factors, Germany has experienced a long-term increase in unemployment and a very low effective retirement age.
Policy has responded to these developments by enacting a series of pension reforms.
These reforms go mainly in two directions: first, the extension of the working life, and second, the gradual lowering of the pension level. Starting in 1992, actuarial adjustments for early retirement were introduced with a relatively long phase-in period. Furthermore, the phasing out of special early retirement options for the unemployed and women was enacted. In 2001, a small subsidized pre-funded pillar of private pensions was introduced ("Riester pension").
In 2004, the benefit indexation was changed by introducing a so called sustainability factor that takes into account the development of the ratio of contributors to the pension system and its recipients. According to the new benefit indexation rule, pensions will grow at a lower rate than wages as long as this ratio declines. In 2007, a law came into effect that increases the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 until 2029.
Public pension benefits in Germany are closely linked to an individual's lifetime employment and wage income relative to average wages in the economy, with relatively few redistributive elements. The Pension Benefit (PB) payment in year s after retirement is the product of four factors: the sum of Pension Points (PP) acquired at retirement age T, a Pension Type factor (PT), an Entry Factor (EF) and the Current Pension Value (CPV). It is calculated according to the following formula:
For old-age pensions PT=1, and it is less than unity for other pension types, e.g., a widow's pension. In the following, we will only analyze old-age pensions. EF is equal to one if the age at retirement equals the statutory retirement age and lower for early retirement. For each month (year) of early retirement the benefit is lowered by 0.3% (3.6%). 4
The most acquire very little pension entitlements equivalent to a bit more than 2 € per month. This is another example of how the impact of reforms on future pensions may differ across birth cohorts. 5
The Current Pension Value (CPV) in the above formula is given by:
where W is the sum for gross wages in the economy, RP is the contribution rate to subsidized private and/or occupational pension schemes, CR is the contribution rate to the public pension fund, PR is the ratio of retirees to contributors to the public pension fund, and α is a weighting factor currently set to 0.25. In our base year 2005 the CPV amounted to 26.13 € in West Germany and to 22.57 €in East Germany. 6
The determination of the CPV has been subject to a couple of reforms. 7 The introduction of the subsidy of contributions to private pension plans ("Riester pension") is reflected by the factor RP. This factor lowers the benefit indexation, even though the supplementary private pension is not mandatory. The contribution rate is set to increase to 5 Between 2000 and 2004, PP acquired while receiving means-tested unemployment benefits were caculated on the basis of the benefit amount and not on the prior income. 6 The lower CPV in East Germany is intended to compensate for the higher pension points given to East Germans by increasing their individual wages by an "adjustment factor" which should account for the still substantially lower level of the average wage in East Germany. Currently this adjustment factor amounts to about 18%, whereas the regional differential of average wages is about 15%. Thus, despite the lower CPV, individual pension contributions in East Germany are actually treated more generously in the pension formula than in West Germany. In our simulations we keep these regional differences in the CPV and the mentioned adjustment factor constant. 7 In this paper, we only focus on gross pensions and ignore taxation. Therefore we do not model the long-term reform of the tax treatment of pensions in 2004. An analysis of that reform can be found in Buslei and Steiner (2006) . 4% of gross earnings until 2011 and remains constant thereafter. The 2004 reform introduced the sustainability factor which links pension growth to demographic ageing.
Demographic ageing will most likely reach its peak in the 2030s which results in a growth rate of pensions that is lagging behind the growth rate of wages. This implies lower individual replacement rates on average. Due to the complex rule for the adjustment of the CPV, it's future trajectory has to be simulated making assumptions on the changes of all factors that enter the adjustment rule (see Section 3.3).
Data and Microsimulation Methodology
Data
According to the pension formula discussed in the previous section, the simulation of future pension benefits requires detailed information of current individual entitlement (the number of pension points) as well as estimates of future pension accruals until retirement. The estimation of future pension entitlement would have to account for cohort effects in labor market histories, future earnings, and the individual retirement age. Since there is no data set publicly available in Germany that includes all the required information, we have to combine various data sources for the simulation of individual pension benefits. We combine data from the SOEP and administrative data of individual insurance records provided by the Research A description of the SOEP is provided by Wagner et al. (2007) . simulated from retrospective work history data recorded in the SOEP are likely to contain substantial measurement error. This is a particular problem for East Germany because it does not seem feasible to back-cast wages in the former GDR based on market wages after reunification. The calculation of individual pensions in East Germany is also rendered extremely difficult due to complex regulations concerning the integration of pension entitlements from the former GDR into the unified pension system in Germany. 9 Thus, the determination of individual pension entitlements in the base year for East Germans is not feasible based on SOEP data alone. Because of the complex pension legislation, to a much lesser extent this is also true for West Germany. 10 We therefore match administrative information West Germany, there are only two categories for East Germany since there are only very few people with less than secondary education. We provide some information on the matching procedure in the appendix. For each observations in the SOEP matched to a statistical twin in the VSKT data we replace the simulated amount of pension entitlement by that recorded in the latter data base. For SOEP observations for which no statistical twin could be found the simulated amount is maintained.
Finally, we use a 10% random sample (about 90,000 observations) of all new retirees in 2006 for the simulation of the age of retirement (see Section 3.3). 12 After restricting the sample to old-age pensioners who retired between 60 and 65 years we are left with about 68,000 observations. 9 Himmelreicher et al. (2007) describe the integration of pension entitlements of former GDR citizens. 10 An example would be the pension rights adjustment after a divorce which occurred before the individual joined SOEP. 11 These data are provided as a scientific use file (SUFVSKT2005) by the Research Data Center of the Public Pension Fund. Detailed descriptions of the data are contained in DRV (2008) and Himmelreicher and Stegmann (2008) . 12 These data are provided as a scientific use file of the so-called "Versichertenrentenzugang" (SUFRTZN06XVSBB) by the Research Data Center of the Public Pension Fund. The data are described in DRV (2006).
Estimation of cohort effects and wage equations
To link individual labor market histories to lifecycle earnings profiles, which determine the level of an individual's future pension, we first estimate the impact of cohort effects on the cumulated duration of the various labor market states. In a second step, we estimate relative wage equations relating individual wages to labor market histories and a number of other potential wage determinants. Our maintained hypothesis is that cohort effects enter the wage equation only indirectly through their impact on an individual's labor market history. We start with a brief description of the estimation of cohort effects in labor market histories and then describe the modeling of the wage equation.
Cohort effects
We assume that the cumulated duration in a particular labor market state, Y it *, can be modeled as a linear function of the birth cohort K it , the individual's age A it , period (year) dummies P it and a vector of other control variables, X it :
where the labor market states are full-time employment and unemployment for men, and additionally part-time employment and non-employment for women. The control variables include age of the oldest child, dummies for other children, marital status, nationality, and education. The error term ε is assumed to be uncorrelated with these variables.
Because of the linear dependence of age, period, and cohort the identification of linear cohort effects this specification requires a restriction on these effects. Here, we follow Deaton (1997) and assume that period effects are orthogonal to a linear trend and sum to zero over all observation periods. 13 This assumption allows to decompose the effects in three different dimensions: the trend (cohort), the profile (age), and the business cycle (period).
Since the cumulated duration in most labor market states is zero for a non-neglible share of people, we estimate tobit models of the form:
where the original period dummies have been transformed as described above. Estimation of this equation is based on 21 waves of the SOEP for West Germany and 15 waves for East Germany spanning the period 1984-2005 and 1990-2005, respectively . People in education or already retired as well as civil servants and the self-employed are not included in the analysis. We estimate separate tobit models for each of the sub-groups defined by region (East and West German), gender, and by the level of education.
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix report for each of these groups estimated marginal effects of the cohort dummies on the cumulated duration in the various labor market states:
These effects are evaluated at sample means of the explanatory variables in the model including age. Thus, these effects give the pure cohort effects on the cumulated duration of, e.g., unemployment at a given age. For example, for West German men with low level of education the estimated effect for the youngest cohort (1967-71) implies that, evaluated a sample means, the cumulated unemployment duration of this group exceeds that of the oldest cohort by about 2 years. Estimated cohort effects differ significantly by gender, region, and the level of education. In East Germany, for example, estimated effects imply almost 5 years more unemployment relative to the oldest age cohort for the youngest cohort of men with low or medium level of education, compared to about 2 years for those with higher education. For East German women the corresponding estimated cohort effects are about 8 years and 3 years respectively. Tables A2 and A3 also show large differences in estimated cohort effects across gender, region and level of education regarding the cumulated labor market states. The implications of estimated cohort effects for employment and unemployment over the life-cycle will be discussed in Section 4.1.
Wage equations
The dependent variable in the wage equation is the log of the ratio of the individual monthly gross wage in a given year to the average wage of the insured population in that period. 14 Explanatory variables are age, the cumulated duration of unemployment and (in case of women) non-employment and part-time employment, all entered as polynomials of degree three. Since we include these as well as age the duration of full-time cannot be identified separately. Cohort effects impact on individual relative wages through their effects on the duration variables. The control variables contained in X it include time dummies, dummies for 14 We use this uncensored wage measure in the estimation although we calculate the expected wage accounting for the censoring at the lower and upper social security thresholds in the simulations below. Using all observations avoids estimating a double-censored regression model and takes advantage of all available information in the estimation.
industry, firm size, and nationality. 15 Unobserved wage determinants are modeled by the two error components u i and v it which are assumed to be independently normally distributed. The specification of the wage equation thus is:
This equation is estimated on a sub-sample of observations also used for the estimation of cohort effects, i.e. those people for whom we observe a wage subject to social security contributions. Civil servants and the self-employed are not included. As in the estimation of cohort effects, we estimate separate relative wage equations for each of the sub-groups defined by region, gender, and the level of education.
As shown by Figure A1 in the appendix, the empirical age-earnings profiles derived from our estimated relative wage equations differ substantially by education. 16 The higher its level, the higher the individual wage relative to the average wage in the economy and, hence, the higher the acquired number of pension points. Although this relationship holds for men and women in East and West Germany throughout the life-cycle after the first few years of employment, the slope of the age-earnings profile differs markedly between these groups.
Age-earnings profiles are relatively flat for persons with low or medium education and fairly steep for higher educated people. These profiles differ substantially by gender and region, however, especially for people with higher education. In West Germany, relative wages of men in this group continuously increase with age until the age of sixty and will have almost doubled by then. In contrast, higher educated women experience a steep wage increase until their early thirties followed by a reduction and a subsequent rebound in their relative wage.
This pattern can be explained by the relatively weak labor force participation and a high share of part-time employed West German women in their thirties and early forties due to child-care responsibilities. Since this used to be, and still is, much less true for women in East Germany, their age-earnings profiles are, on average, similar to those of East German men. For West German men and women with low education, relative wages remain flat or 15 Industry and firm-size dummies are normalized ("orthogonalized") so that setting them all equal to zero yields their average effect on the relative wage. This normalization is used in the simulations below to predict wages of individuals for whom we currently do not observe wages, i.e. we assume that their expected wage equals the average wage with respect to these characteristics. 16 Detailed estimation results for the relative wage equations are available from the authors upon request.
even decrease with age, and slightly increase for men with a medium level of education. In East Germany, relative wages of both men and women with low or medium education also change relatively little over the life-cycle.
On the one hand, these differences in empirical age-earnings profiles imply that people with low level of education accumulate little earnings potential over their life-cycle, in contrast to higher educated people. On the other hand, flat age-earnings profiles also imply that employment interruptions have relatively small effects on future earnings and thus the level of the public pension. yields the expected total number of pension points an individual is expected to earn until retirement. Since early retirement is still the rule rather than the exception in Germany, despite the associated substantial reduction of the pension entitlement (see Section 2.2), we have to model the future evolution of the effective retirement age.
Simulating future pension levels across birth cohorts
We do this in a simplified way by extrapolating the distribution of the effective retirement age of people retiring in 2006 (see Figure A2 in the Appendix) by a common factor that should reflect the recently enacted long-term increase of the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 years (see Section 2.2). 18 Since we focus on old-age pensions here, we apply the same factor to men and women and -in our base scenario -also to East and West Germany. 19 Since the average effective retirement age in 2006 was about 63 years, this implies a long-term increase to 65 years in the simulation. As shown by Figure 1 , the expected increase in the effective retirement age is not linear. This is due to the abolishment of early retirement options for unemployed and women, which implies a relatively strong increase in the expected retirement age of people in the birth cohorts 1947-56. 18 It is difficult to quantify the effects of the recent pension reforms effective retirment age in the distant future. Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) estimate that the pension reforms in 1992 and 1999 which enacted the adjustment factors for early retirement pensions have increased the average retirement age by two years for men and less than one year for women. In 2006, the average retirement age of women was actually above and that for men below the values implied by these estimates. Gender differences in changes of the retirement age could be related to the inclusion of disability pensions in these estimates. For old-age pensions, there is a clear positive trend in the effective retirement age for both men and women. 19 In the more optimistic labor market scenario for East Germany discussed in Section 4.4 below we assume that the effective retirement age converges between the two regions.
Figure 1 Adjustment of the effective to changes in the legal retirment age
Fourth, based on the simulated individual pension points and projections of the current pension value we derive individual pension benefits. As discussed in Section 2.2, the current pension value (CPV) is determined by the growth rate of the average gross wage in the economy and some adjustment factors to the pension formula. Following the Ageing Working Group (AWG), the average real gross wage in the economy is projected to grow at an annual rate of 1.6 % (European Commission 2005). Given this projection, the CPV is calculated using the formula in Section 2.2. Figure 2 shows the development of gross wages and the CPV in the simulation period.
Due to the adjustment factors in the pension formula, there is an increasing divergence between the average gross wage and the CPV. Since population aging will peak during the 2030s, and this is accounted for in the "sustainability factor" included in the CPV formula, the difference between gross wages and the CPV will reach a maximum towards the end of the simulation period. By then, the CPV will fall short of the average gross wage by almost 20 percentage points. 
Simulation Results
Employment and unemployment until retirement
As described in Section 3.3, for the younger birth cohorts we have to simulate a large part of their labor market behavior until retirement. Starting from our base year 2005 and using the estimated cohort effects we simulate for each individual the cumulated employment and unemployment durations until the expected individual retirement age. In our base scenario we assume that these cohort effects estimated over a period of high and increasing unemployment, especially in East Germany, also determine future labor market behavior across birth cohorts. In the following simulation of the cumulated employment and unemployment durations the individual retirement age differs across age cohorts but is assumed to be determined by the current legal retirement age of 65 years. This assumption will be relaxed when we simulate the level of pension benefits below. In East Germany, younger male birth cohorts experience a dramatic decline in employment and increase in unemployment durations. In the group with low or median education, the simulated duration in full-time employment from about 40 in the oldest to less than 36 years in the youngest cohort, in the high education group from about 37 to 31 years.
Correspondingly, the simulated duration of unemployment in the group of persons with low or medium education soars from about 2 years in the oldest to more than 9 years in the youngest birth cohort. Unemployment also rises sharply for East German men with higher education, 1.4 years in the oldest to more than 5 years in the youngest birth cohort. This clearly shows the long-term consequences of the catastrophic labor market situation in East Germany.
Even worse seems the likely evolution of employment and unemployment for younger birth cohorts of East German women. The simulated duration of full-time employment falls 21 Changes in the simulated cumulated employment and unemployment durations between cohorts therefore differ from estimated cohort effects as reported in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix. 22 The cumulated duration of non-employment of West German women has declined across birth cohorts in all education groups. For example, in the high education group non-employment duration is estimated to decline from 14 years to about 11 years. In contrast, non-employment of East German women in the high education group is expected to increase slightly across cohorts, although starting from a very low level of less than 2 years (see Steiner and Geyer 2009, Chapter 4.3.1) .
from more than 30 years in the oldest to 24 years in the youngest cohort for women with low or median education, and from almost 35 years to less than 27 years in the high education group. The cumulated duration of unemployment of East German women with low or median education more than quadruples from about 3 years in the oldest to about 13 years in the youngest cohort. The increase in unemployment across birth cohorts is also substantial for the high education group for whom the simulated duration increases to 7 years in the youngest cohort. This dramatic increase of female unemployment can only partly be related to differences in non-employment between East and West Germany.
The effects of pension reforms on the average pension level
The introduction of the demographic adjustment factor in the pension formula and the phasing-in of a higher statutory retirement age described in Section 2.2 will have heterogeneous effects on individual pension levels across birth cohorts. While the pension reductions due to the adjustment factor will be larger for younger birth cohorts, the effects of the increase of the statutory retirement age will depend on the adjustment of the effective retirement age across birth cohorts. In the following we assume that the effective retirement age adjusts to the increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 years as described in Section 2.2, i.e. will also increase by two years over the phase-in period. To get an impression on the relative impact of these two policy reforms, Table 3 presents simulated pension benefits 23 for four alternative scenarios for West German men. In the first two scenarios the statutory retirement age is kept at 65 while the adjustment factor is introduced in Scenario I but not in Scenario II. This latter difference also distinguishes Scenario III and Scenario IV which also allow for the legislated increase in the statutory retirement age. We present these calculations for West German men, for whom we do not find large cohort effects in employment and unemployment durations. This allows us to abstract from cohort effects in employment histories and disentangle the reform effects in a simple way. For the other groups we document simulation results in Table A6 in the appendix.
The relative stability of employment histories across cohorts is reflected by the stability of pension benefits across cohorts under the Scenario I. In the absence of reforms, the pension benefit remains well above 1000 € per month for all cohorts. This changes when the legislated slower growth rate of the current pension value due to the demographic 23 As we do not model income taxation in this paper, all pension benefits are gross amounts. However, we do substract pensioners' own contribution to the health and long-term care insurance. That is, here and in the following we report the effective amount of pension payment ("Rentenzahlbetrag") in the terminology of the German pension insurance.
sustainability factor is allowed for. In Scenario II, the pension level of younger cohorts declines relative to the oldest cohort. As expected and shown by the relative change in the pension benefit under Scenario I and Scenario II, the negative impact of the introduction of the adjustment factor is the bigger, the younger the age cohort. The youngest two age cohorts have to bear a reduction in the pension benefit of 13-14 percent due to this adjustment factor, compared to an average reduction across all cohorts of less than 8 percent. Due to the slow phase-in of the statutory retirement age, which reaches 67 years only in 2029, the largest effects of this policy change occur for the two youngest birth cohorts. As shown by the relative change in the pension value under Scenario III and Scenario I in Table 3 , the extension of the working life reduces the effect of the lower pension growth for the two youngest birth cohorts by almost 5.
Comparing the evolution of pension benefits across birth cohorts under Scenario III and
Scenario IV shows that the assumed adjustment of the effective retirement age to the increased statutory retirement age partly compensates for the slower CPV growth rate. As shown by the column referring to Scenario IV, the net effect of these two policy changes is a fairly stable level of pension benefits of West German men across birth cohorts. However comparing this scenario to the one without adjustment of the pension formula and increase of the retirement age (Scenario I) reveals that the pension benefit is reduced by almost 10 percent for the youngest birth cohort, compared to an average reduction of only about 5 percent across all cohorts.
The level and distribution of pension benefits in the base scenario
Our simulation results on the level and distribution of pension benefits across birth cohorts presented in this section refer to Scenario I which includes the already legislated changes concerning the adjustment factor and the increase of the statutory retirement age. In general, we report pension benefits at the individual retirement age. In the case of two-person households, the simulations refer to the date when both spouses are retired. All pension benefits are discounted by the growth rate of real wages to make them comparable across birth cohorts. Due to the lower growth rate of pension benefits relative to wages the current pension value for younger birth cohorts will decline, although pension benefits will continue to grow in real terms. The sample is restricted to persons who were not civil servants or selfemployed in the base year 2005. This restriction excludes very low pensions resulting from brief employment spells under the social security system, e.g. of persons who acquired pension entitlements at the beginning of their career but subsequently became civil servants.
The analysis is restricted to own pensions derived from the public pension scheme which are by far the most important source of income in old age for the great majority of the population. Compared to all other groups, West German males across all birth cohorts can expect to receive the highest pension benefits. The slight negative trend in this group's pension benefit across birth cohorts is, as analyzed in the previous section, mainly driven by the lower CPV growth rate due to the demographic adjustment factor. The youngest cohorts receive a pension that is still about 95 percent of the pension of the oldest cohort. The gross replacement rate of West German men hovers in the youngest birth cohort still reaches about 45 percent and is only 2 percentage points less than the replacement rate of the oldest cohort. 25 The own pension received by women is, on average across all birth cohorts, less than half the amount received by men in West Germany. On average, their pension benefit is less than the one received by women in East Germany. In contrast to all other groups, however, the pension benefit received by younger cohorts of West German women is substantially higher than that obtained by the older cohorts. This is the more remarkable as the older cohorts are not affected by the demographic CPV adjustment and shows the importance of the increasing labor market attachment of younger women in West Germany. Still, the youngest cohort of West German women reaches a replacement rate of only 24 percent. Looking at simulation results for East Germany, the evolution of pension benefits across birth cohorts looks much different. Whereas the average pension benefit of East German women is almost 700 € per month, and thus more than 100 € above the amount obtained by women in West Germany, it is only 466 € for the youngest birth cohort. This is only about 70 percent of the pension benefit received by the oldest cohort of women in East Germany. As shown in the previous section, about 10 percentage points are due to the net effect of the demographic adjustment factor and the increase in the retirement age. Thus, about 20 percent of the reduction of the pension benefit in the youngest age cohort of East German women would be related to increased unemployment and lower wages.
Average pension levels and replacement rates
For East German males the development is even more dramatic. Whereas East German men in the oldest birth cohort reach a pension benefit of about 900 €, birth cohorts 1952-6 and younger have to expect a substantially smaller amount. The pension benefit of the youngest birth cohort of a bit less than 600 € is only two third of the amount received by the oldest cohort of East German men. The youngest birth cohort was about to enter the labor market when the wall came down and was especially hard hit by the catastrophic development of the East German labor market. From a policy perspective, the share of pension benefits below 600 € is important because this amount is close to the average means-tested subsistence level for single pensioners ("Grundsicherung im Alter"). 26 A single pensioner with an income below that threshold would be entitled to receive social assistance up to that limit by the state. Since we focus on individual pensions and do not take into account other household incomes we can, of course, make no strong statements concerning poverty issues. Still, the extent to which own old-age pensions lift the retired out of poverty is of substantial interest for social policy.
The distribution of individual pension benefits
Whereas the share of West German men receiving pensions below 600 Euro is less than 3 percent even among younger age cohorts, one out of three East German men in the younger birth cohorts will receive a pension below this amount. While this share will change little in West Germany, it will increase dramatically from about 4 to more than 30 percent in East Germany. The already high share of low pensions among East German women will roughly double, from about 25 percent in the older to almost 50 percent in the younger cohorts. The share of low pensions is even higher among West German women, although it is expected to fall slightly from about 60 in the older to 55 percent in the younger cohorts.
The distribution of pension benefits by the level of education
The distribution of pension benefits in the total population disguises important differences by the level of education which is one of the major factors shaping life-time earnings. Thus, to shed some light on these differences, Table 6 reports means and percentiles of pension benefits for the birth cohorts 1952-71. We focus on the younger cohorts here to save space and, more importantly, because in these cohorts the share of people with low pensions is expected to be extremely high, especially in East Germany. 27
Looking first at the simulation results for West German men, the group with relatively high average pensions, Table 6 reveals that for about a fourth of all people in the group with 26 The Federal Statistical Office reports an average gross amount of 627 € in 2006 for individuals aged 65 and older (DESTATIS 2008) . a low level of education the expected pension benefit is below 660 €, and thus only marginally higher than the minimum pension. Even the median pension of 740 Euro for this group is only 100 € above the minimum pension. The distribution of pension benefits among East German men with low or medium education is similar as for West German men with low education, although the median is even a bit smaller. Compared to West German men with medium education, pension benefits in East Germany are substantially smaller at all percentiles of the distribution. Notes: Percentiles refer to the individual pension benefit. Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations.
As shown by Table 6 , the picture is much different for women. Pension benefits of West German women with low education are very small: The median in the younger age cohorts is only a little more than 300 €, and even the 95 percentile is only a modest amount of 640 Euro, which exactly amounts to the current value of the minimum pension. These very 27 As already mentioned in Section 3.1, we had to aggregate low and medium levels of education levels into one in East Germany because of the small number of people with low education. low pensions result partly from the low wage of women with low education, partly from this group's low attachment to the labor market. This latter factor may also explain the relatively low level of pension benefits among West German women with higher education, for whom the median is only about 640 €. Pension benefits of East German women with high education exceed those of women in West Germany at each percentile of the distribution. Also, East German women with low or medium education obtain higher pension benefits than West
German women with medium education at each percentile in the lower half of the distribution. These differences result from the stronger labor market attachment of women in East Germany, in particular their higher share of full-time employment.
Pensions at the household level
From a policy perspective, the low level of pension benefits of women has to be assessed by taking into account other household incomes as well. Small own old-age pensions of women need not imply a low living standard. Here, we focus on pension income from the spouse and analyze the distribution of pensions benefits at the household level. To this end, we simply average the amounts of old-age pension benefits received in couple households to represent the individualized pension at the household level. 28 We present both average pension benefits (Table 7) and their distribution (Table 8 ) across birth cohorts.
Table 7 Average pension benefits (€ per month) at the household level across birth cohorts
For West German couples the average pension benefit per person remains fairly stable at about 850 € across birth cohorts. This corresponds to the evolution of individual pension benefits in West Germany described above: Its slight reduction for men is more or less compensated by its increase for women. In contrast, for East German couples there is a very strong negative trend in the level of average pensions across birth cohorts. Due to the relatively high pension benefits received by women, the level of the average pension benefit received by older birth cohorts of East German couples is similar to the level of West German couples in the same cohorts. The substantial decline of the average pension benefit of couples in East Germany from about 800 € to less than 600 € is the result of the drop of individual pensions among men and women in the younger birth cohorts. The evolution of pensions of singles, both in East and West Germany, is similar to what has been described above at the individual level. Hence, marital status of pensioners as such does not seem to effect pension benefits much. Table 8 shows the distribution of pension benefits at the household level. Across all cohorts, the share of low pensions among couples is small compared to single women. Only about 10 percent of couples in both East and West Germany have a pension of less than 600 € per person, compared to almost 60 percent of single women in West German and more than 30 percent of this group in East Germany. In West Germany in particular, relatively high pensions of between 900 and 1200 € per person are much more common among couples than among single women.
Looking at changes across birth cohorts, Table 8 displays a sharply increasing share of low pensions in East German couple households: among the younger birth cohorts, 15 percent receive a pension of less than 600 €, compared to only 5 percent among the older cohorts. The share of relatively high pension benefits exceeding 900 € received by this group also falls substantially in the younger cohorts, from 38.5 to 16.8 percent. In contrast, the slight decline in the share of very low pensions among couples in West Germany is accompanied by a marked of relatively high pension in the younger birth cohorts.
A more optimistic labor market scenario
The simulations from the previous sections are based on estimated cohort effects which imply a rather pessimistic outlook for the future level of pension benefits of younger birth cohorts in East Germany. These cohort effects in employment patterns and relative wages are estimated on data from the period 1990-2005, which saw a dramatic increase in registered long-term unemployment in East Germany. Since we have to simulate employment and wage developments for up to 30 years in the future for the youngest birth cohort, these simulations very much depend on the question whether these cohort effects can be used to project labor market outcomes in the distant future. The effects of past unemployment on future pension benefits cannot be made disappear but future employment may not decline and unemployment increase as strongly as observed in the past in East Germany.
Given the long projection period for the youngest cohorts and the uncertainty surrounding these projections, in the following we present simulation results derived under the scenario "positive labor market East Germany". Instead of simulating future employment and unemployment durations using estimated cohort effects, we average these effects across all birth cohorts in this scenario. Hence, the sharp increase in the future duration of unemployment among younger birth cohorts is diminished relative to the baseline scenario.
Given the improvement in future labor market conditions in this alternative scenario, we also assume that the effective retirement age of East Germans increases to the West German level, which implies a long-term increase of about one more year in East Germany.
The left part of Table 9 shows the simulation results for the individual pension benefit and the replacement rate in this scenario, the right part the changes relative to our base scenario. Across all birth cohorts, the pension benefit increases by about 8 percent, on average, in the scenario with a more positive labor market development in East Germany, with a somewhat stronger increase for women. The replacement ratio increases by about three percentage points, on average, to about 44 percent for men and 37 percent for women.
Although the overall negative trend in the evolution of pension benefits across birth cohorts is not reversed, it becomes substantially weaker in this scenario. The reduction of the pension benefit in the youngest cohort is, on average, 11 percent less than in the base scenario, and the decline in the replacement rate is reduced by 6 percentage points. Somewhat weaker effects of a positive labor market on pension benefits and replacement rates in East Germany can be observed for the birth cohort 1962-66 and, still somewhat diminished, for the cohort 1957-61. Notes: The replacement rate is the ratio of the monthly pension benefit to the average monthly gross wage in East and West Germany, respectively. The distribution of pension benefits in the base scenario is documented in Table 5 . Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations.
The comparison of the distribution of pension benefits across birth cohorts in our base and alternative scenario in Table 10 reveals a relatively strong reduction in the share of very small pension benefits. In the younger age cohorts, the share of pensions below 600 € drops by 19 percentage points for men and 16 percentage points for women. This strong reduction would be accompanied by an increase in the share of monthly pensions of more than 900 € by almost 10 percentage points for men and 5 percentage points for women. Notes: The distribution of pension benefits in the base scenario is documented in Table 5 . Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations.
The large differences in simulations results between the two scenario illustrate the importance of future labor market developments for the level and distribution of pension benefits of younger birth cohorts in East Germany. In our view, the alternative scenario seems rather optimistic since, at the individual level, it implies relatively weak effects of longterm unemployment cumulated in early years on future employment patterns. Thus, younger birth cohorts will have to experience less unemployment between, say, age 40 and the retirement age than older cohorts in order to partially compensate for the much longer unemployment durations experienced by these cohorts in younger ages and the low pension rights that result from long-term unemployment since 2005. Labor market developments in East Germany give little reason to be overly optimistic in this respect. Thus, our alternative scenario probably lies near to the upper bound of likely outcomes of the development of pension benefits in East Germany.
Conclusion
Our goal has been to quantify the likely impact of changing employment patterns and pension reforms on the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts in Germany. To this end, we have developed a microsimulation model which accounts for cohort effects in individual employment and unemployment and earnings over the lifecycle as well as the differential impact of recent pension reforms on birth cohorts. Using simulated life cycle employment and income profiles, we have shown that public pensions of East German men and women will fall dramatically among younger birth cohorts, not only because of policy reforms but due to higher cumulated unemployment. For West German men, the small reduction of average pension levels among younger birth cohorts is mainly driven by the impact of pension reforms, while future pension levels of West German women are increasing or stable due to increasing labor market participation among younger birth cohorts. These simulation results refer to our "base scenario" which takes into account the demographic adjustment factor and the long-term increase in the statutory retirement age introduced recently to stabilize the contribution rate to the public pension system.
Regarding the distribution of individual pension benefits, for the younger birth cohorts of East German men and women our simulation results imply high shares of pensions below the minimum pension recently introduced to avoid poverty among pensioners. Furthermore, the distribution of pension benefits in the total population disguises important differences by the level of education which is one of the major factors shaping life-time earnings. Even in the group of West German men whose average pension level is relatively high also among younger age cohorts, a large share of those with a low level of education will obtain public pensions which are very close to the minimum pension, and that even the median pension of this group is only marginally above that level. While the very high share of individual pensions below the level of the social minimum among West German women will decline somewhat in the younger birth cohorts, it will increase dramatically for both men and women in East Germany. Also at the household level, the share of low pensions among married women will increase dramatically in younger birth cohorts in East Germany.
Since these simulation results are based on projecting labor market developments observed in the past into the distant future for younger birth cohorts, which by necessity has to rely on highly uncertain assumptions especially for East Germany, we have also simulated the evolution of future pensions across birth cohorts under a more optimistic labor market scenario. This scenario implies that future employment patterns of younger birth cohorts will
Statistical Matching of SOEP and Pension Insurance Accounts
The merging of SOEP and VSKT is performed by a statistical matching procedure to identify statistical twins. This is a common microsimulation method to combine data sets statistically when no unique identifier in two or more data sets is available (O'Hare 2000; D'Orazio et al. 2006) . 29 We apply a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching with replacement (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, Ch. 25.4) . That is, cases are matched for which the absolute difference in terms of the propensity score is minimized within 54 subsets of the data ("cells") defined by age-groups, gender, region, education and insurance status. Within these cells, we further match on individual labor market characteristics and -for women -the number of children. Since education is a very important matching variable, which is missing for more than 40 percent of all observations in the VSKT, we can only use a sub-sample of about 25,500 observations to match statistical twins to the about 12,800 observations in the SOEP data. We cannot include persons with foreign citizenship because they are not part of the VSKT. For them, pension benefits are simulated using the SOEP.
The effectiveness of the matching procedure can be checked by testing the differences in the means of matching variables in the matched data set. Results of standard t-tests of the difference in means from two independent samples show that no statistically significant differences remain in any of the matching variables (see Geyer and Steiner 2010, Table A3 -3). More interesting are any remaining differences in employment patterns in the base year 2005 and pension points that are not used as matching variables. As described in the text, pension points are simulated in the SOEP on the basis of retrospective data and directly available in the VSKT from cleared insurance accounts. Table A1 shows large differences in the means of these variables in the two data sets before matching, and differences remain statistically significant after matching in most cases.
The average number of pension points after matching is significantly larger in the VSKT than in the SOEP in all groups, varying between 2.6 percentage points for East German women and almost 4 percentage points for women in West Germany. These relatively large differences result from both the longer cumulated employment durations of women recorded 29 SOEP has been matched to administrative data on pensions in several other studies. Rasner et al. (2007) analyse the complementarity with respect to data on pensioners of SOEP and administrative data from the Research Data Center of the Public Pension Fund. Frick and Grabka (2010) use a matched data set to analyse the social security wealth of the population. Krenz et al. (2009) match the insurance record sample to the large IAB employment sample (IABS).
in the VSKT and the much more precise recording of individual entitlement periods obtained during non-employment spells in the VSKT relative to those simulated on the basis of SOEP.
data. This in particular concerns entitlement periods related to child-rearing activities of women, but also more generally to the way pension entitlement acquired in the GDR were counted after their integration in the West German pension system. Since pension entitlements in the PSIA are measured much more precisely than those derived from the SOEP, we substitute the latter by the former for all observations for which a statistical twin could be found in the matched data set in the base year 2005. We use simulated pension benefits derived from retrospective SOEP data only for those persons for whom no statistical twin could be found. In particular, this concerns people with foreign nationality who are not included in the PSIA data set, Notes: Random-effects estimation, with σ u , σ e estimated error components; s. e. in parentheses; * / ** / ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%-/ 5%-/ 1%-level. All estimations include a constant and time effects; control variables are a dummies for German nationality and orthogonolized dummies for firm size and industry.
Additional Tables and Figures
Source: SOEP, own calculations Low/Medium High non-employment duration -0.05*** -0,14*** -0,14*** -0,07*** -0,09*** (0.01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,02) (non-employment duration) 2 /100 0.20*** 1,40*** 1,28*** 0,19* -0,39 (0.05) (0,09) (0,24) (0,10) (0,39) (non-employment duration) 3 /100 -0.04*** -0,59*** -0,53*** -0,01 0,57** (0.01) (0,05) (0,15) (0,03) (0,24) (non-employment duration) 4 /100 0,00*** 0,00** (0,00) (0,00) part-time employment duration -0.09*** -0,11*** -0,15*** -0,11*** -0,10*** (0.01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (part-time employment duration) 2 /100 1.10*** 1,29*** 2,07*** 1,32*** 1,27*** (0.10) (0,07) (0,16) (0,14) (0,18) (part-time employment duration) 3 /100 -0.48*** -0,54*** -1,06*** -0,57*** -0,66*** (0.05) (0,04) (0,10) (0,08) (0,12) (part-time employment duration) 4 /100 0.00*** 0,00*** 0,00*** 0,00*** 0,00*** (0.00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) Currently part-time employed -0.89*** -0,84*** -0,83*** -1,04*** -0,80*** (0.01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,02) (0,03) age 6.81*** 8,53*** 1,60*** 0,10 -1,43*** (0.57) (0,56) (0,42) (0,09) (0,45) age 2 /100 -41.88*** -54,49*** -7,74*** -0,31 7,85*** (4.06) (3,83) (2,21) (0,35) (2,26) age 3 /100 1.35*** 1,82*** 0,19*** 0,00 -0,20*** (0.15) (0,14) (0,06) (0,01) (0,06) age 4 /1000 -0.24*** -0,33*** -0,02*** -0,00 0,03*** (0.03) (0,03) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) age 5 /1000 0.00*** 0,00*** 0,00*** -0,00*** (0.00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) age 6 /10000 -0.00*** -0,00*** (0.00) (0,00) σ u 0.38 0,37 0,42 0,30 0,29 σ e 0.28 0,28 0,30 0,25 0,22 Number of observations 9.482 19.648 8.190 6.544 5.528 Number of individuals 1.696 3.420 1.619 1.191 808
Notes: Random-effects estimation, with σ u , σ e estimated error components; s. e. in parentheses; * / ** / ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%-/ 5%-/ 1%-level. All estimations include a constant and time effects; control variables are a dummies for German nationality and orthogonolized dummies for firm size and industry. G = Geringe Bildung, M = Mittlere Bildung, H = Höhere Bildung. Szenario  I  II  III  IV  II/I  III/I  IV/I   pension Tables A2 and 3 and relative wage regressions in Tables A4 and A5. 
Source: SOEP, own calculations
Table A6 Impact of pension reforms on the average pension benefit by birth cohortwomen in West Germany, men and women in East Germany
